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The year 1998 was one of human-
made and natural adversity in the
Pacific Islands. The economic down-
turn in east Asia worsened, reducing
export opportunities and economic
growth throughout the region. For
this and other reasons Papua New
Guinea reduced public spending
sharply, while Fiji responded by
devaluing the Fiji dollar early in the
year, in order to restore the competi-
tiveness of its tourist and garment
industries. The El Nino southern
oscillation that began in 1997 contin-
ued. Warm waters fed heavy rains in
the eastern Pacific and South America,
while cool waters brought drought in
the western Pacific. The worst
droughts were in the Federated States
of Micronesia, where dozens of atolls
ran out of fresh water, and in Fiji,
where the sugar crop was halved by a
drought of unprecedented length and
severity and farmers were reduced to
accepting food from the government.
A tsunami struck coastal villages west
of Aitape in Papua New Guinea in
July, sweeping more than two thou-
sand people to their deaths in the
lagoons and forest behind, and
prompting a rescue operation so
daunting that many bodies could not
be recovered. Outside the region in
diplomatic and legal terms, yet part of
it in the minds of many, Irian Jaya
was the scene of renewed indepen-
dence protests against Indonesia and
renewed military suppression.
Times were uncertain for island
leaders. Island economies struggled,
and answers were not obvious,
though aid donors and international
financial institutions preached one
answer relentlessly. Progress on climate
change and fisheries conservation was
slow. Yet 1998 saw the beginnings of
a resolution of two political issues
that had preoccupied the region for
years-the future status of New Cale-
donia and the conflict in Bougainville.
A felicitous change of name for the
old South Pacific Commission
occurred when it became the Pacific
Community in February.
Pacific Island states were caught up
in the rhetoric, the ideology, and the
economic policies of globalization in
1998, and seemed likely to remain so.
In this they followed in the footsteps
of larger countries-Australia, Japan,
and New Zealand in particular-
whose aid and investment confer
influence over the regional agenda.
The key phrases in the region in
1998, much bandied about by Pacific
Island government officials, were
almost all about economics. They
included "improving the attractive-
ness of the foreign investment
regime," "right-sizing the civil ser-
vice," "focusing on the needs of the
private sector," "reducing public sec-
tor subsidies," "meeting benchmarks
in the reform process," "promoting
integration into the world economy,"
"enabling public enterprises to oper-
ate on commercial principles,"
"improving the business environ-
ment," "achieving effective private-
public sector partnerships," and
"adopting measures to reduce infra-
structure, service, and energy costs for
the business sector."
Worldwide, states have been shift-
ing foreign policy focus from security
to economics since the end of the cold
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war, and the change has been happen-
ing in the Pacific Islands as well.
Economic ministers from the South
Pacific Forum countries first met at
Cairns in 1997, a meeting overshad-
owed by the Australian Eyes Only
(AUSTEO) scandal caused by the leak-
ing of top-secret Australian docu-
ments with blunt and offensive
descriptions of island governments
and politicians. Because it was free of
sensation, the 1998 Forum Economic
Ministers Meeting (FEMM) allowed a
clearer view of how far the policy
pendulum in the Pacific Islands is
swinging toward what might be called
the globalization agenda. In order to
reap the benefits of an increasingly
integrated and interdependent global
economy, it is argued, Pacific Island
states must become internationally
competitive, and the way to do that is
to deregulate economic life, minimize
subsidies, privatize government enter-
prises, assist foreign investment,
improve public accountability, reduce
tariffs, and move toward complete
free trade. The first meeting of Forum
economic ministers adopted a Forum
Economic Action Plan along these
lines, and the second agreed on fur-
ther measures.
The key criteria against which the
Forum economic ministers measured
success were those enunciated by the
three international economic institu-
tions that now have the greatest influ-
ence on economies in the Asia-Pacific
region-the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation group
(APEC). In the case of investment poli-
cies, for example, the second Forum
Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM2)
undertook to apply APEC principles,
"focusing initially on those which
reflect the priorities raised by the pri-
vate sector." On public accountability,
it endorsed the IMF Code of Principles
and Good Practices on Fiscal Trans-
parencyas "a model on which Forum
countries can draw." On domestic
economic reform, it promised to
report in 1999 on progress in imple-
menting APEC and WTO principles and
obligations. Even Forum Island states
that are not APEC or WTO members-
only Papua New Guinea is a member
of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation group, for example-
undertook to embrace these principles
as seemed appropriate. The Forum, as
an APEC observer, sent ministers from
island states to APEC ministerial meet-
mgs.
The issues addressed by the second
Forum Economic Ministers Meeting
were "open, liberal and transparent
investment policies," "strategies for
enhancing competitiveness," "ratio-
nalizing and progressively reducing
tariffs," multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion, and almost as an afterthought,
the "reform impact," that is, the
effect of policy changes on the people
of Pacific Island countries (FS 1998b).
Demystified, what did this mean for
the governments of the fourteen
Forum Island countries?
Those governments no longer
doubt that foreign investment is a
good thing-the more the better-and
believe they should go out of their
way to attract it. The governments
with state-owned power and telecom-
munications companies want either to
privatize them or permit them to
operate in a commercial way in com-
petition with private competitors.
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They will reduce tariffs and move
toward a South Pacific Forum Free
Trade Area in the long run. They will
work together on a joint policy posi-
tion for the next round of WTO trade
liberalization negotiations. The last
was the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GAlT), which ended in 1994
with one major change of potential
advantage to Forum Island states-
the inclusion of agricultural trade
under the terms of the agreement,
which became the World Trade
Organization in 1995. The further lib-
eralization of trade in agriculture-in
practice largely meaning the reduction
of government subsidies to farmers in
Europe and the United States-
remains something that all Forum
countries want and will press for.
Finally, Forum Island governments
say they will build on "existing social
safety net systems" and cushion the
blows that many ordinary people
might experience under these reforms.
The difficulty is that the logic of wel-
fare provision runs counter to that of
the modern, privatized economy with
a diminished public sector and a poli-
cy of cutting public spending.
The theme of the annual South
Pacific Forum meeting, held this time
in Pohnpei-"From Reform to
Growth: The Private Sector and
Investment as the Keys to Prosperity"
-captured the spirit of the times and
reflected the influence of the second
Forum Economic Ministers Meeting
on the Forum agenda as a whole. In
the technical language of the Forum
communique, the Forum "noted the
importance of the private sector and
investment as the keys to economic
growth and agreed that efforts should
be made to ensure macro economic
stability by improving fiscal disci-
pline, further progressing public sec-
tor reforms and broadening the tax
base" (FS 1998a, para 3). Translated,
this meant that Forum Island govern-
ments would give business open
slather, spend less, cut the numbers of
civil servants, and move more of the
tax burden from companies to indi-
viduals. One critic of this triumph of
market forces at the Forum was the
director of the Pacific Islands Devel-
opment Program at the East-West
Center, Sitiveni Halapua, who pointed
out that the "people who are telling
us we must globalize are also the
same people who made us write the
Five Year Plans" (AFP, 25 Aug 1998).
He was not against the idea of eco-
nomic growth, but thought it one-
dimensional and limiting. Harsher
critics came from the Fourth Nongov-
ernment Organization Parallel Forum
held in Pohnpei before the official
one. AzizChoudry of GAlT Watchdog
argued that free trade and investment
regimes of the kind being adopted by
Forum Island governments were lead-
ing to "a new relationship of servi-
tude to the economic powers-coun-
tries and companies-which have
their eyes on the region. The Pacific
deserves far better than to be locked
into a permanent race to the bottom
to provide cheap labor and natural
resources and new frontiers for profit
at the expense of its peoples and frag-
ile environment" (PN 1998).
Forum Island governments in the
late 1990S have no alternative but to
welcome the globalization agenda and
embrace policies of economic liberal-
ization. The international pressures
are too great to do otherwise. Yet at
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the same time they rightly fear the full
effects of open global competition.
Take telecommunications, for exam-
ple. New technologies and open com-
petition are enabling companies in the
advanced industrialized countries to
offer drastic reductions in the price of
international telephone calls, and the
United States has reduced internation-
al settlement rates for telecommunica-
tion services. The I998 Forum
"strongly urged the United States to
recognize the adverse consequences
for all Forum Island Countries of that
decision," which is depriving them of
revenue (FS I998a, para I3).
A more far-reaching case is the
Lome Convention between the
European Union and African,
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states.
The Pacific ACP states (Fiji, Kiribati,
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu)
have for years benefited from the
trade preferences that give their agri-
cultural exports preferential access to
the European market. Fiji in particu-
lar has depended heavily on the high
price for its sugar paid under the
Lome arrangements, a price that has
sustained an entire social system of
small-farm sugar production by most-
ly Indo-Fijian tenant farmers. The
fourth Lome Convention, covering
aid and trade to former European
colonial dependencies in Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific, expires in
2000. It will be replaced by arrange-
ments that are yet to be negotiated
but will not offer trade protection of
the old kind, for reasons that point to
the globalizing revolution now begin-
ning to sweep over the Pacific Islands.
The convention could not be succeed-
ed by something similar because its
protective provisions run counter to
WTO rules about international trade.
And, in any case, the global move-
ment toward free trade renders special
concessions, such as access to markets
at lower tariff levels, less special. A
similar effect applies to the South
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic
Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA),
whose value to Pacific Island coun-
tries falls as Australian tariffs fall.
Much is at stake in this transition
from the fourth Lome Convention to
what is called the Successor Agree-
ment. The Pacific ACP states met in
Suva in April and fashioned a joint
negotiating position, which ACP min-
isters then took to the Acp-European
Union talks in Brussels in September
and October, the start of a diplomatic
process that, as Sir Geoffrey Henry
said, would "no doubt prove long
and arduous" (Henry I998). Minis-
ters emphasized the region's economic
reform credentials and hoped that,
post-Lome, their small and isolated
countries would not be left to survive
entirely without protection in an
increasingly free-trade world. The
negotiations continued in I999.
Development classification has
long been important for Pacific Island
countries, because to be classified by
international organizations as a Least
Developed Country brings benefits
and concessions even in a rapidly
globalizing world. For this reason the
Forum pushed again for the comple-
tion of a comprehensive vulnerability
index-a measure of the exposure of
economies to forces beyond govern-
ment control such as natural disasters,
smallness, and isolation-which could
then be included among the criteria
for determining Least-Developed-
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Country status. Vulnerability is an
issue that Pacific ACP ministers raised
in their talks with the European
Union, and it will be raised again at
the 1999 United Nations special ses-
sion on small-island developing states.
Finally, Pacific Island countries
continued in 1998 to keep watch over
their one considerable and generally
shared resource, fisheries. Coastal
states and distant-water fishing
nations agreed in the 1997 Majuro
Declaration to negotiate a multilateral
agreement on managing the tuna
resources of the central and western
Pacific, and the parties met in Tokyo
in june 1998 for the Third Session of
the Multilateral High Level Confer-
ence on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific (now the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Conference).
On one side were the member states
of the Forum Fisheries Agency; on the
other were the Pacific rim states that
take most of the fish-japan, the
United States, Taiwan, China, and the
Republic of Korea. The purpose of
the conference was to consider draft
articles for a regional conservation
and management regime that would
be binding on all parties, whether
those that hold the exclusive econom-
ic zones where the fish are or those
that send boats to catch them. The
key issues were: What is to be the
total allowable catch within the exclu-
sive economic zones and on the high
seas, and who is to decide it? How
will the regime be enforced? These
issues pitted the Asian states against
the Forum states, with the United
States' large delegation supporting the
Forum position on questions of com-
pliance and enforcement. japan
pressed for fishing allocations to be
based on the previous catches made
by distant-water fishing nations and
opposed the idea that coastal states
hold sovereign rights over total allow-
able catches within their exclusive
economic zones, even though such
rights are guaranteed by the UN Law
of the Sea Convention. In other
words, japan wanted the fishing
nations rather than the "fished
nations" to have control, or at least a
large say, over total allowable catches
(Tarte 1998). The Forum later talked
of the "positive strides" made in
Tokyo, but it was hard to see what
they were. The negotiations continued
in 1999 (FS 1998a, para 24).
Regional security remained a sec-
ond-order issue in 1998, except for
Bougainville, but the annual Forum
Regional Security Committee met in
Suva and continued work on develop-
ing coordinated regional responses to
security problems as defined in the
1997 Aitutaki Declaration. These
included not only challenges to terri-
torial integrity but-more important-
ly-drug trafficking, money launder-
ing, fraud, and other crimes that have
the potential to destabilize the affairs
of very small states. With French test-
ing long since finished, opposition to
it was no longer the defining regional
issue of a few years before. And since
the International Atomic Energy
Agency study of the Moruroa and
Fangataufa test sites found "negligible
residual contamination as a result of
nuclear testing," the Forum could do
little but call on France to continue
radiological monitoring and to
address the health concerns of the
people of French Polynesia. The
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regional nuclear issue in 1998 was
not testing, although the Forum con-
demned the tests carried out by India
and Pakistan, but rather the shipment
of radioactive wastes through the
Pacific. The Forum decided to negoti-
ate with France, Japan, and the
United Kingdom on the liability
regime covering compensation in case
of accident.
The other side of the faster eco-
nomic growth promised by economic
liberalization is damage to the envi-
ronment, above all in the form of
global warming and possible rises in
sea levels. The climate-change issue
proved highly divisive at the 1997
Forum meeting in Rarotonga, where
Australia bullied its island neighbors
into removing any mention in the
communique of uniform and binding
greenhouse-gas emission targets. At
the Kyoto climate change conference
later that year, Australia was one of
just three countries permitted to
increase emissions of greenhouse
gases in the treaty period, by 8 per-
cent over 1990 levels up to 2012. All
other countries undertook to reduce
emissions. As the Australian environ-
mentalist Clive Hamilton has pointed
out, Australia has "by far the highest
emissions per person of any country
in the world" (Australian, 17 Dec
1997). The 1998 Forum once again
endorsed the deep concerns of its
member states about the impact of
greenhouse gases on sea levels and
weather, and urged that the momen-
tum of Kyoto be maintained. Yet
everyone knew that the concerns of
the Forum Island states were much
deeper than those of Australia, the
world's largest exporter of coal.
National interest in these issues
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sharply divides the Forum Island
states from the Forum's largest and
richest member.
Representatives of Forum Island
states attended a regional workshop
on climate change organized by the
Forum Secretariat and the South
Pacific Regional Environment Pro-
gramme (SPREP) before proceeding to
the Fourth Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change at
Buenos Aires in November. SPREP
organized a press conference in
Buenos Aires, where Pacific delegates
described the devastation of serious
droughts in Fiji and the Federated
States of Micronesia, the erosion of
coastlines, and even the submergence
of small islets-including one called
Tabua Tarawa-under what they said
were rising seas around Kiribati (PN,
5 Nov 1998).
Decolonization is always on the
regional agenda. All fourteen island
states of the South Pacific Forum are
the products of decolonizing processes
of one kind or another, after all, and
political movements in at least some
of the region's territories continue to
call for national sovereignty and free-
dom from colonial control. At one
end of the spectrum, the American
Samoans are happy with their lot.
Governor Tauese Sunia told a UN
Pacific Regional Seminar on Non-Self
Governing Territories held in Fiji in
June that American Samoans did not
consider themselves to be colonized
by the United States; on the contrary,
he said, "We still own our lands. We
have our own constitution, elect our
own public officials and are even rep-
resented in the United States Con-
gress" (SN, 19 June 1998). Tauese
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almost certainly spoke for the vast
majority of his compatriots, who
would regard the departure of the
United States from their territory as a
disaster.
At the other end of the spectrum
stands New Caledonia, the French
territory convulsed in the 1980s by a
militant independence movement led
by the Front de Liberation NationaLe
Kanak et SociaListe (FLNKS). From the
violence and deaths of the 1980s
there emerged the Matignon Accord,
agreed between the mainly Kanak
FLNKS, the mainly French RassembLe-
ment pour La CaLedonie dans La
Republique (RCPR), and the govern-
ment of France in 1988. Matignon
offered the territory a breathing space
of ten years, during which the French
authorities invested in infrastructure,
education, and health across the terri-
tory, and devolved some powers to
regional assemblies in the north of the
Grande Terre and the Loyalties, as
well as Noumea, giving Kanak politi-
cians modern political responsibility
, for the first time. The idea was that a
vote on New Caledonia's future polit-
ical status would take place at the end
of the ten-year period. As the year
1998 approached, however, French
settler and Kanak politicians entered
into negotiations over a new arrange-
ment that would avert a return to vio-
lence by further deferring the final
vote on independence.
The result of these negotiations
was an agreement unique in the histo-
ry of decolonization, the Noumea
Accord, signed by the French govern-
ment, the FLNKS, and the RCPR on 5
May 1998. The accord is best
described as an ingenious piece of
semidecolonization: ingenious because
it seems to offer so much to the con-
tending parties that 72 percent of
New Caledonians voted in its favor in
the referendum of November 1998,
and semidecolonization because it
provides for irreversible transfers of
power from the French state to New
Caledonia over the next fifteen to
twenty years, with the promise of a
referendum on national sovereignty
for the territory sometime between
2013 and 2018. France, it is true,
retains so-called royal powers over
justice, public order, defense, foreign
affairs, and currency, and to that
extent nothing changes. But powers
previously jealously guarded by
Paris-such as control over the
exploitation and management of the
territory's exclusive economic zones-
are among those transferred to the
New Caledonian authorities during
the first five years, with later transfer
of powers over police, finances, and
resources. Importantly, the accord rec-
ognizes for the first time a New
Caledonian citizenship distinct from
French citizenship, a major concession
by the French state.
The Noumea Accord, moreover, is
written in a tone unprecedented in the
history of French colonization any-
where. It recognizes the destructive
consequences of the French presence
for the Kanak people:
The shock of colonization brought
with it a lasting trauma for the original
population. The clans were deprived of
their name and even their land. A sig-
nificant colonization of the land
entailed considerable displacement of
the local population, through which
the Kanak clans saw their means of
subsistence reduced and their sites of
memory lost. This dispossession led to
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a loss of reference points to define their
identity. Kanak artistic heritage was
denied or pillaged. To this negation of
the fundamentals of Kanak identity
were added limits on public liberties
and an absence of political rights, even
though the Kanaks had paid a heavy
price in defending France, most
notably in the First World War. The
Kanaks were pushed back to the geo-
graphic, political and economic mar-
gins of their own country. The colo-
nization so undermined the dignity of
the Kanak people that they were
deprived of their identity. Men and
women lost their lives and their rea-
sons for living in this confrontation.
(PNA 1998)
As amends for this suffering, the
accord promises land reform, a "cus-
tom status" for Kanaks under French
law, recognition of custom authori-
ties, the promotion of Kanak lan-
guages, the return of Kanak artifacts
held in museums abroad, and the res-
urrection of Kanak place-names. The
signing ceremony for the Noumea
Accord symbolized the new accep-
tance by France that Kanak culture is
central to the history and future of a
territory that might yet become the
independent republic of Kanaky. The
ceremony coincided with the opening
of the Jean-Marie Tjibaou Cultural
Center outside Noumea, an architec-
tural tour-de-force by Renzo Piano,
the same man who designed the
Pompidou Center in Paris and the
Berlin Potsdamer Platz and who on
this occasion was inspired by tradi-
tional Kanak building forms. The cen-
ter consists of ten soaring pavilions in
three villages linked by a Kanak path-
way. A Forum delegation that attend-
ed the signing ceremony took the
opportunity of lobbying French Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin for France's
support over post-Lome arrange-
ments. The Forum welcomed the
Noumea Accord and will admit New
Caledonia as an observer from 1999.
Much will depend on the extent to
which the numerous undertakings of
the Noumea Accord are honored.
Land reform, for example, will need
to be more thoroughgoing than in the
past in order to meet Kanak expecta-
tions, as the descendants of French
settlers still own much of the territo-
ry's land. At the extreme of possibili-
ties, a future right-wing government
in Paris could always court domestic
popularity by ordering a change of
direction in New Caledonia, as
Jacques Chirac did as prime minister
in 1986. Paris retains enough power,
even under this accord, to do so.
The year 1998 was a turning point
in Bougainville as much as in New
Caledonia. The extraordinary events
of the previous year had prepared the
way. The Sandline affair, by dramatiz-
ing the threat of yet more armed con-
flict on Bougainville, made ordinary
Bougainvilleans more war-weary than
ever. The 1997 Papua New Guinea
and Solomons elections brought con-
ciliatory leaders to power. Joseph
Kabui, vice president of the Bougain-
ville Interim Government, and Sam
Kauona, commander of the Bougain-
ville Revolutionary Army (BRA),
emerged as rebel leaders willing to
talk peace and to negotiate a truce,
leaving Francis Ona isolated and with
a much-diminished following of rebels
who still wanted war. New Zealand,
trusted for its neutrality, brought all
sides together and succeeded in nego-
tiating the Burnham Truce. An
unarmed regional truce-monitoring
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group, consisting of military and aid
personnel from New Zealand,
Australia, Fiji, and Vanuatu, entered
Bougainville, to be succeeded in early
1998 by a similar peace-monitoring
group.
The parties agreed to extend the
truce in January 1!J98 under the terms
of the Lincoln Agreement on Peace,
Security and Development on
Bougainville, which promised "a per-
manent and irrevocable ceasefire" on
the island from midnight on 30 April
(LA 1998, 3.1). On that day the par-
ties-representatives of the PNG gov-
ernment, the pro-PNG Bougainville
Transitional Government, the anti-
BRA Bougainville Resistance Force,
the pro-BRA Bougainville Interim
Government, and the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army itself-signed an
annex which provided that "[a]s from
that hour all parties will continue to
refrain from all hostile acts or the car-
riage or possession and the use of
arms, ammunition, explosives and
other instruments of death, injury or
destruction on Bougainville" (LAA I,
1998, 2.1). The Solomons prime min-
ister, the foreign ministers of Fiji,
New Zealand, and Australia, and a
representative of UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan were among
those who signed as witnesses.
The transformation of Bougainvil-
lean life that began with the 1997
truce continued in 1998. For the first
time since the conflict began, people
were able to move about, to leave
their villages, to go from the moun-
tains to the coast or from the coast to
the mountains, and to replace their
worn-out spades, knives, and cooking
pots. Some had not been home for a
decade. One member of the AusAID
Truce Monitoring Team, Jan
Gammage, said all that was left of
Arawa were "the ribs of destroyed
buildings" poking through the under-
growth (Francis 1998, II). Of the aid
donors committed to reconstructing
and rehabilitating Bougainville, the
most important is Australia, part of
whose special five-year allocation of
A$100 million was being spent, among
other things, on building a hospital in
Buka, reconstructing schools, upgrad-
ing airstrips that had not been used
for years, and clearing roads.
The peace process moved slowly.
From his mountain hideout, Francis
Ona called for all peace monitors to
be shot, declared no-fly zones for the
PNG government and the Peace
Monitoring Group, encouraged his
men to shoot at passing helicopters,
told people not to listen to his former
ally Joseph Kabui, and claimed to be
in charge of the "Mekamui Defence
Force," Bougainville having been
declared the independent republic of
Mekamui in 1990 (PC, 25 Sept 1998).
His followers refused to surrender
their arms, fearing retribution, and
sporadic violence-as much criminal
as political-continued on the island.
A meeting between the parties to the
ceasefire was scheduled for June but
failed to take place. Some PNG lead-
ers-Special Minister of State Rabbie
Namaliu, for example-saw the
Noumea Accord as a model that
Papua New Guinea might follow,
raising the possibility of a large
degree of autonomy for the North
Solomons within the larger country,
though no firm decision was made
(SMH, 28 July 1998). Free elections for
a Bougainvillean Reconciliation
Government were supposed to have
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been held by the end of 1998 under
the terms of the Lincoln Agreement,
but had not occurred, and meantime
Bougainvillean leaders, including
Joseph Kabui, vowed to establish
their own Bougainville People's
Congress.
The collapse of the Indonesian
economy and serious rioting in
Jakarta forced the resignation in May
of President Suharto, who once para-
chuted into Dutch New Guinea as
part of a force sent to expel the
Netherlands from the island of New
Guinea. The Indonesian military
forces were actively engaged against
independence activists in Irian Jaya
for the entire thirty-two years of
Suharto's presidency, and his resigna-
tion was the signal for renewed inde-
pendence demonstrations. The
anniversary of an abortive indepen-
dence declaration on I July 1961
became the occasion for raising the
independence flag in Sorong, Nabire,
Wamena, and the capital, Jayapura,
where the crowd was estimated at
three thousand. Protesters also flew
the flag atop a water tower at the
jetty at Biak. The flag remained there
for four days, until the military
attacked at 5:30 AM on 6 July, open-
ing fire from four sides on about 200
people sleeping near the tower.
Soldiers took others out to sea.
Church investigators later document-
ed 70 bodies washed up on the Biak
coast, and two Australians on the
island described widespread atrocities
(SMH, 14 Nov 1998). The Indonesian
government announced the end of
special military operations in the
province in October, following a
ceasefire said to have been negotiated
with rebel forces, but representatives
of the Movement for Free Papua
(OPM) denied that a ceasefire existed.
The policy of the new Indonesian
government under B J Habibie was to
reduce the military presence while
arresting separatists and entering into
discussions with Irianese over
demands for greater autonomy. When
Habibie became president, Papua
New Guinea reiterated its longstand-
ing policy of opposing independence
in Irian Jaya, and Pacific Islands
regional organizations made no com-
ment because the province is part of
Indonesia under international law and
does not participate in regional
affairs. For all its problems, the
Pacific Islands region proper was far
better off than its sister territory in
Indonesia.
STEWART FIRTH
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